Chaotic by Mlodinow, Leonard
16
cha • oTIc : (ka ät´ik) adj. 
1. in a state of chaos;  
in a completely confused 
or disordered condition  
2. of or having to do with 
the theories, dynamics, etc. 
of mathematical chaos  
3. how Hollywood really 
operates By Leonard Mlodinow
July 2, 2006    
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                                                                                                        he magic of Hol-
lywood success—how can one account for it? Were the executives at Fox and 
Sony who gambled more than $300 million to create the hits “X-Men: The 
Last Stand” and “The Da Vinci Code” visionaries? Were those at Universal 
responsible for the box-office disaster “United 93” and their peers at Warner 
Bros. and Virtual Studios who pumped $160 million into the flop “Poseidon” 
just boneheads? 
The 2006 summer blockbuster season is upon us, one of the two times 
each year (the other is Christmas) when a film studio’s hopes for black ink are 
decided by the gods of movie fortune—namely, you and me. Americans may 
not scurry with enthusiasm to vote for our presidents, but come summer, we 
do vote early and often for the films we love, to the tune of about $200 million 
each weekend. For the people who make the movies, it’s either champagne or 
Prozac as a river of green flows through Tinseltown, dragging careers with it, 
sometimes for a happy, wild ride, sometimes directly into a rock.
But are the rewards (and punishments) of the Hollywood game deserved, 
or does luck play a far more important role in box-office success (and failure) 
than people imagine?
We all understand that genius doesn’t guarantee success, but it’s seduc-
tive to assume that success must come from genius. As a former Hollywood 
scriptwriter, I understand the comfort in hiring by track record. Yet as a 
scientist who has taught the mathematics of randomness at Caltech, I also am 
aware that track records can deceive. That no one can know whether a film 
will hit or miss has been an uncomfortable suspicion in Hollywood at least 
since novelist and screenwriter William Goldman enunciated it in his classic 
1983 book “Adventures in the Screen Trade.” If Goldman is right and a future 
film’s performance is unpredictable, then there is no way studio executives or 
producers, despite all their swagger, can have a better track record at choosing 
projects than an ape throwing darts at a dartboard.
That’s a bold statement, but these days it is hardly conjecture: With each 
passing year the unpredictability of film revenue is supported by more and 
more academic research.
That’s not to say that a jittery homemade horror video could just as easily 
become a hit as, say, “Exorcist: The Beginning,” which cost an estimated $80 
million, according to Box Office Mojo, the source for all budget and revenue 
figures in this story. Well, actually, that is what happened with “The Blair 
Witch Project” (1999), which cost $60,000 but brought in $140 million—more 
than three times the business of “Exorcist.” (Revenue numbers reflect only 
domestic receipts.)
What the research shows is that even the most professionally made films 
are subject to many unpredictable factors that arise during production and 
marketing, not to mention the inscrutable taste of the audience. It is these 
unknowns that obliterate the ability to foretell the box-office future.
But if picking films is like randomly tossing darts, why do some people hit 
the bull’s-eye more often than others? For the same reason that in a group of 
apes tossing darts, some apes will do better than others. The answer has noth-
ing to do with skill. Even random events occur in clusters and streaks.
Imagine this game: We line up 20,000 moviegoers who, one by one, flip a 
coin. If the coin lands heads, they see “X-Men”; if the coin lands tails, it’s “The 
Da Vinci Code.” Since the coin has an equal chance of coming up either way, 
you might think that in this experimental box-office war each film should be 
in the lead about 10,000 times. But the mathematics of randomness says oth-
erwise: The most probable number of lead changes is zero, and it is 88 times 
more probable that one of the two films will lead through all 20,000 custom-
ers than that each film leads 10,000 times. The lesson I teach in my course is 
that the fairness of the goddess of fortune is expressed not in alternations of 
the lead but in the symmetry of probabilities: Each film is equally likely to be 
the one that grabs and keeps the lead.
If the mathematics is counterintuitive, reality is even worse, because a 
funny thing happens when a random process such as the coin-flipping exper-
iment is actually carried out: The symmetry of fairness is broken and one of 
the films becomes the winner. Even in situations like this, in which we know 
there is no “reason” that the coin flips should favor one film over the other, 
psychologists have shown that the temptation to concoct imagined reasons to 
account for skewed data and other patterns is often overwhelming.
In science, data are not accepted as meaningful if they’re the result of 
chance alone. People in the film industry are diligent about gathering data, 
but are far less skilled at understanding what the numbers mean. The fact is, 
financial success or failure in Hollywood is determined less by anyone’s skill 
to pick hits, or lack thereof, than by the random nature of the universe. The 
typical patterns of randomness—apparent hot or cold streaks, or the bunch-
ing of data into clusters—are routinely misinterpreted and, worse, acted upon 
as if a new trend had been discovered or a new epiphany achieved. And so, 
despite a growing body of evidence that box-office revenue follows the laws 
of chaotic systems, meaning that it is inherently unpredictable, the super-
structure of Hollywood’s culture—that pervasive worship of who’s hot and 
the shunning of who’s not—continues to rest on a foundation of misconcep-
tion and mirage.
 
 L
ast year was a champagne year for Brad Grey, who took 
over in March 2005 as chairman and chief executive of-
ficer of Paramount’s Motion Picture Group. Under the 
previous regime, Paramount had been experiencing, as 
Variety put it, “a long stretch of underperformance at 
the box office.” Paramount’s parent company, Viacom, 
applied the usual strategy: ax the studio head and bring 
in a new guy with new ideas.
What followed is a Hollywood ritual. Grey’s next 
moves were described in the trades as a “sweeping revamp” and “massive 
makeover.” Among the many forced to walk the plank were Donald De Line, 
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Paramount’s president; Rob Friedman, vice chairman and chief operating of-
ficer of the Motion Picture Group; and Bruce Tobey, an executive vice presi-
dent. Grey rebuilt the studio according to his own philosophy and presented 
it to the press as a hipper, edgier film company cleansed of the outmoded 
thinking that had weighed down Paramount’s bottom line. And now, under 
Grey and his wise helmsmen, Paramount’s ship is making way.
At least that’s what the Hollywood establishment likes to believe. After all, 
it justifies the salaries of all those senior executives. But like many Hollywood 
plot lines, this one doesn’t hold up under closer scrutiny. To understand what 
really happened at Paramount—the same thing that has happened time and 
again in the movie industry—we have to look at the events that led to the situ-
ation Grey was hired to fix.
When Viacom Chairman Sumner Redstone bought Paramount Pictures 
in 1993, he inherited Sherry Lansing as studio chief and decided to keep 
her on. Until just a few years ago, that seemed brilliant, for, under Lansing, 
Paramount won best picture awards for “Forrest Gump,” “Braveheart” and 
“Titanic” and posted its two highest-grossing years ever. So successful was 
Lansing that she became, simply, “Sherry”—as if she were the only Sherry 
in town. But Lansing’s reputation soon plunged, and her tenure would not 
survive the duration of her contract.
In mathematical terms there is both a short and long explanation for 
Lansing’s fate. First, the short answer. Look at this series of numbers: 11.4%, 
10.6%, 11.3%, 7.4%, 7.1%, 6.7%. Notice something? So did Redstone, for those six 
numbers represent the market share of Paramount’s Motion Picture Group 
for the final six years of Lansing’s tenure between 1999 and 2004. The trend 
caused BusinessWeek to speculate that Lansing “may simply no longer have 
Hollywood’s hot hand.” In November 2004, she announced she was leaving, 
and a few months later Grey was brought on board.
How could a sure-fire genius lead a company to seven great years, then fail 
practically overnight?
There had been plenty of theories explaining Lansing’s earlier success. 
Prior to 2001, Lansing had been praised for making Paramount one of Holly-
wood’s best-run studios, controlling costs and having the ability to make $100 
million hits from conventional stories. But when her fortune changed, the 
revisionists took over. Her penchant for making successful remakes and se-
quels became a drawback. She was now blamed for green-lighting box-office 
dogs such as “Timeline” and “Lara Croft Tomb Raider: The Cradle of Life.” 
Suddenly, the conventional wisdom was that Lansing was risk-averse, old-
fashioned and out of touch with trends. Most damning of all, perhaps, was the 
notion that her failure was due to her “middle-of-the-road tastes.”
But can she really be blamed for thinking that a Michael Crichton best-
seller would be promising movie fodder? And where were all the “Lara 
Croft” critics when the first “Tomb Raider” film took in $131 million in 
box-office revenue? Even if the theories of Lansing’s shortcomings were 
plausible, consider how abruptly her demise occurred. Did she become 
risk-averse and out-of-touch overnight?
In theoretical physics, the field in which I was trained, a theory’s greatest 
triumph is to predict something that is later confirmed. Some modern-day 
scientists go for less, a kind of confirmation-lite, in which a new theory is 
accepted not because it correctly predicts new phenomena but because it 
verifies things that we already know. In the physics world, the sometimes 
derogatory term for this is postdiction—the “prediction” of something after 
the fact.
Postdiction is less impressive than prediction. But as the final chapter of 
Lansing’s career shows, postdiction is how Hollywood does business.
 
 a
cademic research provides an alternate theory 
of Lansing’s rise and fall: It was just plain luck. 
After all, a film’s path from Lansing’s greenlight to 
opening weekend is subject to unforeseen influ-
ences ranging from bad chemistry on the set to 
nasty competition in the theaters, and even after 
the movie is in the can its appeal is difficult to 
judge. So one could argue that what is farfetched 
is not the comparison of Lansing’s success and 
failure to the tossing of darts, but rather the belief that a studio chief’s taste 
can really matter. That’s not a popular viewpoint in Hollywood, but there are 
exceptions, such as former studio executive David Picker, who was quoted in 
“Adventures in the Screen Trade” as having admitted, “If I had said yes to all 
the projects I turned down, and no to all the ones I took, it would have worked 
out about the same.”
Few people—including Lansing—wish to discuss it, but in Lansing’s case 
there’s already evidence that she was fired because of the industry’s flawed 
reasoning rather than her own flawed decision-making. It’s too early to deter-
mine how Brad Grey is doing, because Paramount’s 2005 films (and even half 
of 2006’s) already were in the pipeline when Lansing left the company. But 
if we want to know roughly how Lansing would have done in some parallel 
universe in which she had not been forced out, all we need to do is look at the 
data from last year.
With films such as “War of the Worlds” and “The Longest Yard,” Paramount 
had its best summer since 1994 and saw its market share rebound to nearly 
10%. That isn’t merely ironic—it’s one of the characteristics of randomness 
called regression to the mean: In any series of random events, an extraor-
dinary event is most likely to be followed, due purely to chance, by a more 
ordinary one. Thus an extraordinarily bad year is most likely to be followed 
by a better one. 
A recent Variety headline read, “Parting Gifts: Old regime’s pics fuel 
Paramount rebound,” but one can’t help but think that, had Viacom had more 
patience, the headline might have read, “Banner year puts Paramount and 
Lansing’s career back on track.”  
Succeed (vi.)
1. to achieve or accom-
plish something planned 
or attempted 2. realize 
a goal or goals, esp. in 
becoming wealthy
3. release critically 
panned “The Da Vinci 
Code” and still make 
about $200 million
[continued on page 42]
Fail (vi.)
1. to be lacking or insuf-
ficient; fall short 2. to be 
unsuccessful in obtaining 
a desired end; miss 3. to 
spend about $160 million 
on a much-hyped “Posei-
don” remake only to see it 
capsize and sink without a 
trace at the box office
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till, anecdotes are just anecdotes. 
That’s where the economists come in. “The moviemak-
ing process is so complicated,” says Anita Elberse of the 
Harvard Business School, “that at the green-lighting stage it 
is unclear whether you can even pull off making the movie 
that you think you are planning to make.” Adds Charles 
Moul of Washington University in St. Louis: “There are two 
schools of thought. According to one, you can’t know the appeal of a film until 
you’ve completed it, but once you have the movie you can run focus groups 
and determine whether it is a hit or a dog. According to the other school, you 
can’t tell even then. Either way, it doesn’t bode well for your ability to make 
$80-million green-lighting decisions that are more than just guesses.”
The leading advocate of the second, more radical school of thought is Ar-
thur De Vany, recently retired professor of economics and a member of the 
Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences at UC Irvine. De Vany likes 
to illustrate the oddities of the film business by comparing films to breakfast 
cereal. If breakfast cereals were like films, he says, each time we visited the 
store we would find a large selection of new cereals, and only a few brands 
that survived from our last trip. Most of these cereals would languish unno-
ticed, but crowds would gather at certain parts of the aisle, scooping up the 
popular brands. And yet, within a few weeks, or at most months, even those 
popular brands would vanish from the shelves. And so our typical cereal 
breakfast would consist of a product we had never before tried, and very well 
might not like, but bought because we heard about it from friends or read of it 
in the newspaper cereal section.
That’s precisely how films behave in the marketplace. If we hear good 
things, we go and perhaps tell others; if we hear bad things, we stay away. It’s 
that process—the way consumers learn from others about the expected qual-
ity of the product—that De Vany found is the key to the odd behavior of the 
film business today. Economists call it an “information cascade.” 
“People’s behavior is simple,” De Vany says, “but in the aggregate it leads 
to a complex system, a system bordering on chaos.”
The theory of chaotic systems grew popular in the 1970s among physicists 
who wanted to understand how phenomena described by a few simple vari-
ables could develop behavior so complex that it’s virtually unpredictable. 
When computers developed in the 1950s, some scientists believed we eventu-
ally could accurately predict and perhaps even control the development of 
rainstorms. They were thwarted by one of the trademarks of chaotic systems, 
a phenomenon scientists call the “butterfly effect.” The term derives from a 
1972 talk by mathematician/meteorologist Edward Lorenz, “Predictability: 
Does the Flap of a Butterfly’s Wings in Brazil set off a Tornado in Texas?” 
According to the butterfly effect, a small change in the early stages of a 
chaotic system can lead to such huge and complicated alterations in its later 
stages that its behavior appears random. In the case of weather, that makes 
long-term forecasts almost worthless. You can measure the basic param-
eters—temperature, pressure, humidity, wind velocity—at thousands of dif-
ferent points and plug them into your theoretical model, but if you miss by a 
tenth of a percent, the rainstorm you predict for Las Vegas on Thursday will 
show up as the snowstorm that hits Boise on Tuesday.
In the film business the butterfly effect means that the budget, the genre, 
the star and the story might all appear to measure up, but if the co-star doesn’t 
quite deliver on her charming smile, if the scenes don’t play out just as you 
imagined them or if the country’s mood changes by just a few degrees, then 
somewhere between the first day of principal photography and the day the 
movie opens the film that you predicted would take the country by storm in-
stead creates a flurry of calls for your resignation. Films don’t succeed or fail 
without reason, but the only reliable predictor of a film’s box-office revenue 
in a given week is its take the prior week, and the best-laid plans of studio 
executives go awry as often as the 10-day weather forecast.
Of course, a studio can try to “make a film” through a massive marketing 
blitz. But although stars and a big ad budget can generate high initial revenues, 
De Vany’s data show that such efforts only help in the opening weeks. After 
that, the information cascade takes over, and unless viewers like the film, the 
money spent on a wide release won’t bring a return. In fact, if viewers don’t 
like the film, a big ad campaign will create a large flow of negative feedback, 
killing the film faster than had the studio not pushed it. The result: a starless 
$18 million film such as “Home Alone” brings in more than $285 million while 
Kevin Costner’s $175 million “Waterworld” dies a quick death, generating a 
disappointing $88 million. 
 a
ctors in Hollywood understand best that the industry 
runs on luck. As Bruce Willis once said, “If you can find 
out why this film or any other film does any good, I’ll 
give you all the money I have.” (For the record, the film 
to which he referred, 1993’s “Striking Distance,” didn’t 
do any good.) Willis understands the unpredictability 
of the film business not simply because he’s had box-of-
fice highs and lows. He knows that random events fueled his career from the 
beginning, and his story offers another case in point.
For seven years, starting in the late 1970s, Willis lived in a fifth-floor walk-
up on 49th Street in Manhattan, struggling to make a name for himself off-
Broadway and in television commercials. Meanwhile, he tended bar to make 
ends meet. He remained a minor actor no matter how hard he worked to get 
good roles, make the right career choices and excel in his trade. Then he made 
the best decision of his life: He flew to Los Angeles for the ’84 Olympics.
While Willis was in L.A., an agent suggested that he go to a few television 
auditions. One was a show already in its final stages of casting. He landed 
the role of David Addison, the male lead paired with Cybill Shepherd in a 
new ABC offering called “Moonlighting.” But choosing Willis was hardly a 
unanimous decision. Glenn Caron, the show’s executive producer, liked Wil-
lis; the network executives thought he did not look like a serious lead. Viewers 
seemed to share their opinion: “Moonlighting” debuted on March 3, 1985, to 
low ratings. Luckily for Willis, in those days networks had patience, and the 
following season the show became a hit.
Willis had all the ingredients for stardom—acting talent, good looks, a 
unique personality—but so do many others who never make it big. For Willis, 
the coin landed heads enough times in a row that he hit the jackpot; for the 
unlucky fellow who would have won the “Moonlighting” lead had Willis not 
Chaotic
[continued from page 19]
Hit (n.)
1. a stroke of good 
fortune 2. a successful 
and popular song, singer, 
book, author, etc. 3. 
spending almost nothing 
on “The Blair Witch 
Project” and making 
more than $140 million
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shown up, the coin took one bounce too many. Other examples of Hollywood’s 
unpredictability are easy to find. “The executives at Warner Bros. didn’t think 
anyone wanted to watch a dark film about a woman boxer,” says Harvard’s 
Elberse. “They made ‘Million Dollar Baby’ because they have an ongoing 
relationship with Clint Eastwood.” And who hasn’t heard the tales of “Ishtar” 
(Warren Beatty + Dustin Hoffman + a $55-million budget = $14 million), or 
“Last Action Hero” (Arnold Schwarzenegger + $85 million = $50 million)? In 
1972 a young director named George Lucas shot a film called “American Graf-
fiti” (1973) for less than $1 million. Universal had doubts about the finished 
film that eventually took in $115 million, and even graver doubts about Lucas’ 
next idea. Lucas called the story “The Adventures of Luke Starkiller, as taken 
from ‘The Journal of the Whills.’ ” Universal called it “unproduceable.” Ulti-
mately, Fox made the film, but its faith in the project only went so far—it paid 
Lucas only $100,000 to write and direct it; in exchange, Lucas received the 
sequel and merchandising rights. In the end, “Star Wars” took in $461 million 
on a budget of $11 million, and Lucas had himself an empire.
I
f hits are so hard to predict, why does it often appear that certain 
people, at certain times, have a hot hand?
The work of former UC Berkeley professor Daniel Kahneman 
helps explain this. While at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem 
in the 1970s, Kahneman and co-worker Amos Tversky addressed 
people’s misconception of randomness and its effect on the way 
we make decisions. His research proved so influential in under-
standing how people make financial decisions that in 2002 Kahneman won 
the Nobel Prize in economics. 
One of the questions Kahneman liked to put to his subjects concerned 
the sequences in a coin toss. For instance, in a toss of seven coins, which of 
the following head-tail combinations is more likely to occur, HHHHTTT or 
HTHTTHT? Most people erroneously believe that the first sequence is less 
likely than the second, but the two sequences—and all other sequences of 
seven heads and tails—are equally probable.
Not only are people bad at recognizing random processes, they also are 
ATTENDUOFFSCAKEQUE
THEPOOHPOLLOBEYUPC
HERESMUDINYOUREYEISO
ODIEHINDUFFAITEN
LASSOSKEEPYOURNOSETO
UNISTEOPA
THEGRINDSTONEGOALONG
EASEPLEATHISLLPUT
CHANIAMBSTRAFEEDO
HAIRONYOURCHESTCANES
ENGOOOOTC
APOSEEATYOURHEARTOUT
BELREPASTOINKUSPO
BREAKALEGORELASIA
RUGRATSSTRIKEMEBLIND
ITSWONYAY
NAMEYOURPOISONFEASTS
AXELTOESTROMNOON
AIMYOUWANTAPIECEOFME
COOINRECELASALTIER
PMSPONDORLYATLEAST
This Week’s Puzzle: Little Miss Literal
PUZZLE SOLUTION
www.comfortablehouse.com
949--515-4450
1959 Harbor Blvd 
Costa Mesa
Best Prices in Southern California
Largest Selection of  Quality
Craftsman Style Furniture
4869051 0528
WE'VE GOT YOU COVERED...
IN LEATHER!
VALLEY LEATHER 
Mon-Sat 
11-6
Sun 12-5
15609 Ventura Blvd. • Encino
(818) 981-8030
www.ValleyLeather.net
Valley Leather
Custom Shop
Swim against a smooth current adjustable to any
speed or ability. Ideal for exercise, water aerobics,
rehabilitation and fun. Just 8' x 15', an Endless
Pool® is simple to maintain, economical 
to run, easy to install inside or out.
For Free DVD or Video Call
(800)233-0741, Ext. 4933
Visit www.endlesspools.com/4933
The Treadmill for Swimmers!
Swim At Home™
)RUDGYHUWLVLQJLQIRUPDWLRQSOHDVH
FRQWDFW1RUD*HUYDLV
DW
/$7LPHVH[W
VOLUME 12 IS HERE!
To order signed copies  
of Merl’s crossword books 
(Vols. 1-12, excluding 7), 
dial toll-free, (800) 431-
1579 (orders only, please)  
or visit www.sundaycross-
words.com.
44
easily fooled into thinking they are controlling them. Sociologists first no-
ticed this while observing gamblers in Las Vegas. Dice players, they noted, 
act as if tossing the dice is a game of skill. They throw them softly if they 
want low numbers, or hard for high ones. Much like Hollywood executives, 
gamblers have their theories about how to make lucky throws. 
The temptation to believe that you or others are causing chance events is 
so strong that psychologists coined a term for it: the illusion of control. In 
a classic study, psychologists Ellen J. Langer and Jane Roth recruited Yale 
undergraduate psychology majors to watch an experimenter flip a coin 30 
times. One by one, the subjects watched the coin flips and tried to guess how 
the coins would land. They found that, although students at an Ivy League 
university are surely aware that a coin toss is a random event, those who ex-
perienced the early winning streaks developed an irrational attitude of confi-
dence that they were “good” at intuiting the coin toss. Forty percent said their 
results would improve with practice; 25% even reported that, if in the future 
they were distracted during the test, their performance would suffer.
 a
lthough economists and psychologists have no prob-
lem understanding Hollywood’s randomness, Hol-
lywood executives, not surprisingly, are generally less 
convinced. “They are hostile to ‘the nobody knows 
anything’ school of thought,” says Moul, “because it 
completely undercuts what they do.” Jehoshua Eliash-
berg of the Wharton business school at the University 
of Pennsylvania says that unlike executives in the pharmaceutical or packaged 
goods industries—other industries he has analyzed—in Hollywood “most 
executives feel threatened.” 
One Hollywood executive who spoke up against De Vany’s work in the late 
1990s was Frank Biondi, who ran Universal. Biondi thought he had it figured 
out. After running the numbers, he concluded that the industry was not as 
chaotic as it appeared. Films that cost more than $40 million had the highest 
return on capital, he said, and so the Harvard MBA directed his studio’s dol-
lars toward films he called “impact movies.”
De Vany scoffs at such notions. “A naive analysis will often present false 
patterns,” he says, “like faces in the clouds. But a careful study reveals that no 
strategy the studios devise is going to give them any kind of advantage at all.” 
Then he adds, “So any studio executive getting paid more than the salary of a 
comparable executive at your local dairy is getting paid too much.”
Who is right? In the case of Biondi and his strategy, the jury has delivered 
its verdict. Two years of impact movies later, with depressed film earnings 
and no relief in sight, Biondi was fired, leaving behind a legacy of film gems 
such as “Meet Joe Black” ($90 million budget, a feeble $44 million box office) 
and “Babe: Pig in the City” ($90 million budget, $18 million box office). 
Old style seat-of-the-pants executives also object to the randomness 
theory. White-haired seventysomething Richard Zanuck, currently develop-
ing the upcoming Tim Burton-directed Jim Carrey film, “Ripley’s Believe It 
or Not,” is the son of 20th Century Fox founder Darryl F. Zanuck. Dick Za-
nuck ran production at Fox and then briefly ran the studio until some major 
dogs such as 1967’s “Doctor Dolittle,” 1968’s “Star!” and 1969’s “Hello, Dolly!” 
crippled the studio financially and led his dad to fire him. Zanuck says he 
understands his being fired. “You don’t keep someone on endlessly hoping 
something will hit,” he told me. “If you have a year of picking badly, you’re 
walking down the street looking for a job.”
In Zanuck’s case, as in Lansing’s, his bad streak ended and regression to the 
mean took over, but not in time to save his job. The films he developed before 
he got canned ended up doing well, and two of them, in fact, won best-picture 
Academy Awards—1970’s “Patton” and 1971’s “The French Connection.”
I asked him if he thought he was fired prematurely.
“I don’t think it hurt my career.”
It certainly didn’t. A few years later, Zanuck became the man responsible 
for Steven Spielberg’s 1974 feature debut, “The Sugarland Express,” as well as 
Spielberg’s 1975 follow-up, “Jaws” (which took in $260 million on a budget of 
about $7 million). Did he feel “Jaws” would be a hit of historic proportions? 
“We didn’t have any idea,” he says. “We bought it from a manuscript, and the 
book became a bestseller while we were still doing the film.”
Zanuck’s career illustrates the randomness theory. He has made success-
ful and unsuccessful films, and he obviously hasn’t had an inkling in advance 
which would be which. But Zanuck disagrees with that take.
“True,” he says, “nobody can pick a hit in advance because unpredictable 
things happen to each individual picture. But if you average over a five-year 
time span, over 100 pictures, 20 a year, the guys with talent will have a higher 
rate of success. You have to judge someone by their entire career.” 
Moul sympathizes with Zanuck’s point of view. De Vany, too, understands 
what Zanuck is talking about. “Zanuck’s father,” he says, “and Thalberg and 
Disney had records of success that went far beyond chance. They were show-
men. They had a knack for picking good stories. But they also had real power 
over their product and its distribution.” They made movies the old-fashioned 
way: Prior to the 1960s, studios were able to integrate production (including 
actors and directors on long-term contracts) with large-scale exhibition inter-
ests. That meant the studio heads not only had complete creative and budget-
ary control, they also controlled the screens so they could adjust the release 
pattern as a film ran, making it less vulnerable to the information cascade.
 W
hy are smart people in Hollywood blind to the 
randomness that rules their industry? Because we 
find comfort in having control. And then there are 
our egos. We like to believe in our own power.
But Langer also uncovered another important 
factor: competition. In the Yale coin-flip study, 
for example, most of the students assessed them-
selves as being better than their counterparts, even if the game was clearly no 
more than a series of random events. 
And so we turn back to Hollywood, where both ego and competition reign 
supreme, and those involved in the game find it hard to believe that success 
and failure lie beyond their control. What lessons can we draw from all this?
De Vany’s voice rises. “Today’s Hollywood executives all act like wimps,” 
he says. “They don’t control their budgets. They give the actors anything they 
want. They rely on the easy answers, so they try to mimic past successes and 
cave in to the preposterous demands of stars. My research shows you don’t 
have to do that. It’s just an easy way out, an illusion.”
Then he adds: “But, hey, it’s Hollywood. Why should we expect the way 
they run the business to be any more real than the films themselves?”
Miss (vi.)
1. to fail to hit something 
aimed at; go wide of the 
mark 2. to fail to be success-
ful 3. to launch an expensive 
and long-awaited prequel to 
1973’s “The Exorcist” that 
turns few heads
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